This paper examines the role of focus versus diversification in explaining the economic impact of corporate capital investments. I find that the stock market's responses to announcements of capital investments are more favorable for focused firms than for diversified firms. I also show that focused firms exhibit significantly better post-investment operating performance than diversified firms. The overall findings in this study suggest that the investment opportunities hypothesis dominates the internal capital markets hypothesis in terms of the net economic impact of capital investments on the investing firms.
I. Introduction
This study investigates the role of focus versus diversification in explaining the economic impact of corporate capital investments by testing two competing, but not mutually exclusive, hypotheses: the investment opportunities hypothesis and the internal capital markets hypothesis. The investment opportunities hypothesis predicts that capital investments are more worthwhile for focused firms than for diversified firms. As suggested by Wemerfelt and Montgomery (1988) and Lang and Stulz (1994) , focused firms tend to have better investment opportunities than diversified firms. Since firms with better investment opportunities are more likely to invest in positive net present value (NPV) projects (e.g., Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1991) ), capital investments by focused firms will be more worthwhile. Diversified firms have poorer investment opportunities and tend to invest more in negative NPV projects, because of a cross-subsidization problem (Scharfstein and Stein (2000) ), a relatively greater propensity to engage in empire building (Jensen (1986) ) or power grabbing (Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000) ), or weaker managerial incentives to maximize shareholder value (Denis, Denis, and Sarin (1997) ).' Capital investments by diversified firms thus may be wasteful.
The internal capital markets hypothesis predicts that capital investments may create more economic value for diversified firms than for focused firms. Weston (1970) , Stein (1997) , and Khanna and Tice (2001) argue that resource allocation is more efficient in internal than in external capital markets. With an internal source of financing, a firm's managers can exercise superior decision control over project selection, rather than leaving the firm's investment decisions to the whims of less well-informed investors in the external capital market. When managers have superior infonnation, they can do a better job of project selection and thus enhance firm value. Managers can broaden their internal capital market and gain these economies by diversifying. Therefore, diversified firms allocate resources more efficiently because they create a larger internal capital market. A version of this argument by Stulz (1990) is that diversified firms, by creating a larger internal capital market, reduce the underinvestment problem described by Myers (1977) . The internal capital market argument suggests that diversified firms are more likely to make positive NPV investments than focused firms.
I examine a sample of firms that announced capital investments during 1989-1999, and find that the average market reaction to capital investment announcements is more positive for focused firms than for diversified firms. These results hold even after I control for other factors that may affect the stock valuation effect of capital investments. I also find a significantly positive relation between postinvestment operating performance changes and degree of corporate focus. My results indicate that capital investments create more economic value for focused firms than for diversified firms. The overall findings in this study suggest that the investment opportunities hypothesis dominates the internal capital markets hypothesis.
This research makes at least two valuable contributions to the literature. First, a large and growing body of literature has carefully investigated the role of focus versus diversification in explaining the valuation effect of inter-corporate acquisitions.^ However, the wealth impact of corporate structure on other important types of corporate investment decisions, such as capital expenditures, has so far escaped the attention of researchers. This study attempts to fill this gap. Second, there is also an increasing amount of empirical literature that analyzes the capital expenditure behavior by diversified firms versus focused firms. ^ These studies focus on the relation between corporate structure and the amount of capital expenditures made by a firm, but they have not examined how corporate structure affects the economic impact of capital expenditures. As indicated by McConnell and Muscarella (1985) and Woolridge and Snow (1990) , there is a variation in the economic value embodied in a capital expenditure. Capital expenditures do not necessarily create positive economic value. They may in fact have a negative 'Treating the manager's incentives as endogenous, Aggarwal and Samwick (2003) find evidence that diversification is increasing in incentives, in contrast to Denis et al. (1997) .
Recent examples include Bhagat, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990) , Kaplan and Weisbach (1992) , Berger and Ofek (1996) , Servaes (1996) , Maquieira, Megginson, and Nail (1998) , and Heron and Lie (2002) .
See, for example, Lamont (1997) , Shin and Stulz (1998) , Rajan et al. (2000) , Khanna and Tice (2001) , and Gertner, Powers, and Scharfstein (2002) . economic impact if the investment is wasteful (Lang et al. (1991) and Chen and Ho (1997) ).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the sample and presents summary statistics. Section III examines the relation between corporate structure and stock price response for firms announcing capital investments. Section IV examines the relation between corporate structure and post-investment changes in the operating performance of capital investing firms. The final section concludes.
II. Sample and Descriptive Statistics
A. Sample Design Data on capital expenditure announcements by firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the American Stock Exchange (AMEX), or the NAS-DAQ are collected from UMI's Wall Street Journal (WSJ) Ondisc database. The search relies on key words including business investments, capital budget, capital expenditures, capital investments, capital outlays, capital spending, long-teim expenditures, and planned expenditures. The sample period runs from January 1989 through December 1999.
I use the following sample selection criteria: i) announcing firms must have retum data available on the Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) database; ii) announcing firms must have business segment information available from Compustat; iii) announcements are not made by public utilities (Compustat SIC codes 4900-4999) or financial institutions (SIC codes 6000-6999); "* and iv) no other announcements are made three days before or three days after the initial announcement.
The final sample comprises 246 announcements of corporate capital investments: 82 by single segment firms and 164 by multiple segment firms. Table 1 reports the sample distribution by calendar year and firm type in Panel A and by investment category and firm type in Panel B. About half of the capital investments are provided for capacity expansion.
B. Measuring Corporate Focus
Following Lang and Stulz (1994) , Comment and Jarrell (1995) , and Denis et al. (1997) , I use Compustat business segment data to calculate three different measures of corporate focus: i) number of segments; ii) a revenue-based Herfindahl index, calculated as the sum of the squares of each segment's revenue as a proportion of total revenue; and iii) an asset-based Herfindahl index, computed using the book value of identifiable assets of the segment. The closer the revenue-based (asset-based) Herfindahl index is to one, the more concentrated the firm's sales (assets) within a few of its segments and, hence, the more focused its operations. (WSJ) . The sampie seiecticn criteria are: i) initial announcement date needs to be cieariy identifiabie in the WSJ; ii) shares of the announcing firms are traded in any of the three iargest U.S. stock markets-the NYSE, the AMEX, and the NASDAQ; iii) announcing firms must have return data availabie on the CRSP database; iv) announcing firms must have business segment information available from Compustat; v) announcements are not made by public utilities {Compustat SIC codes 4900-4999) or financial institutions (SIC codes 6000-6999); and vi) there are no other announcements three days before or three days after the initial announcement date. 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
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C, Control Variables
Summary statistics for control variables by firm type also appear in Table 2 . I obtain data on firm characteristics from Compustat, managerial ownership data from Compact Disclosure, and investment size from the WSJ articles. ^ All values for firm characteristics and managerial ownership are as of the end of the fiscal year preceding the announcement. Differences in means and medians between the two groups in Table 2 are assessed using f-tests and Wilcoxon rank-sum tests.
I estimate investment opportunities by a simple measure of Tobin's q: the ratio ofthe market to book value ofthe firm's assets, where market value of assets equals book value of assets minus book value of common equity plus market value of common equity. This measure is widely used in previous studies (e.g.. Shin and Stulz (1998) and Thomas (2002) ). The single segment firms in the sample have a significantly higher q than the multiple segment firms. This result implies that focused firms tend to have better growth options in their investment opportunity sets, consistent with Wemerfelt and Montgomery (1988) , Lang and Stulz (1994) , Anderson and Lee (1997) Table 2 presents summary information of firm and investment characteristics by firm type. The revenue-based Herfindahl index is caiculated as the sum of the squares of each segment's revenue as a proportion of totai revenue, while the asset-based Herfindahi index is computed in the same way using the book vaiue of identifiable assets of the segment. Tobin's q is the ratio of the market to book value of the firm's assets for the fiscai year before the announcement, where market vaiue of assets is estimated as the book vaiue of assets minus the book vaiue of common equity pius the market value of common equity. Free cash flow is defined as operating income before depreciation minus interest expense, taxes, preferred dividends, and common dividends, divided by book vaiue of totai assets, for the fiscai year preceding the announcement. Debt ratio is the book value of iong-term debt divided by the book value of total assets for the fiscal year prior to the announcement. Firm size is the book value of total assets for the fiscal year prior to the announcement, f^anagerial ownership is the stock ownership by officers and directors for the year preceding the announcement. Size of investment is the dollar amount of investment divided by the book value of totai assets for the year preceding the announcement. Differences in means are assessed using a (-test, and differences in medians are assessed using a Wiicoxon rank-sum test. As there is no variation for the singie segment firms in the number of segments, revenue-based Herfindahl index, and asset-based Herfindahl index, I do not report statisticai differences for these three variables. "', ", and • represent 1 %, 5%, and 10% significance ieveis. Servaes (1996) , and Thomas (2002) . As such firms are more likely to invest in positive NPV projects, the evidence suggests that their capital investments will be more worthwhile than those made by diversified firms. Following Lehn and Poulsen (1989) and Lang et al. (1991) , I define free cash flow as operating income before depreciation minus interest expense, taxes, preferred dividends, and common dividends, divided by book value of total assets. Debt ratio is book value of long-term debt divided by book value of total assets. Firm size is the book value of total assets. Compared to single segment investing firms, the multiple segment investing firms in my sample have significantly more free cash flow and leverage and are significantly larger, similar to findings in Berger and Ofek (1995) , Hadlock, Ryngaert, and Thomas (2001) , Hyland and Diltz (2002) , and Thomas (2002) .
Managerial ownership is measured by stock ownership of officers and directors. Size of investment is measured by amount ofthe investment divided by book value of total assets. As in Denis et al. (1997) , single segment investing firms have significantly higher managerial equity ownership than multiple segment investing firms. They also have a larger investment size than multiple segment investing firms.
III. Corporate Structure and Stock Price Response
A. Overall Sample
Standard event-study methods are employed to examine stock price responses to announcements of corporate capital investments. Day 0 is defined as the initial announcement date. Abnormal retum is calculated as the difference between the actual retum and an expected return generated by the market model. I use the value-weighted CRSP index as a proxy for market retums and estimate the parameters of the market model using data from 200 to 60 days before the announcement date. Significance is evaluated according to r-statistics and Wilcoxon z-statistics. The two-day (-1,0) announcement period abnormal retum captures the price reaction to the announcement. Table 3 shows an average two-day announcement period abnormal retum of 0.39%, significant at the 5% level. The median abnormal retum is 0.17% (significant at the 10% level) and about 57% of sample announcement effects are positive. The results indicate that announcements of corporate capital investments are associated with significantly positive valuation effects, consistent with findings in McConnell and Muscarella (1985) and Woolridge and Snow (1990) . Table 3 presents two-day ( -1,0) announcement period abnormal returns at the announcement of capital investments for the whole sample and for subsamples by firm type. Day 0 is date of the announcement in The Wall Street Journal. Twoday announcement period abnormal returns are estimated using the standard market model procedure with parameters estimated for the period 200 days to 60 days before tfie announcement, (-tests and Wilcoxon signed-rank tests are used to test the hypotheses that the means and medians are equal to zero. Differences in mean and median are assessed using a (-test and a Wilcoxon rank-sum test. *'* and " represent 1 % and 5% significance levels.
Mean abnormal return {%) (-statistic Median abnormal return (%) p-vaiue for Wilcoxon z-statistic Proportion of positive abnormal returns (%) Table 3 divides the sample by single and multiple segment firms. Single segment investing firms have a positive average two-day announcement period abnormal retum of 1.11%, statistically significant at the 1% level. Their median abnormal retum is 0.85%, also statistically significant at the 1% level, and 69.5% of their sample announcement effects are positive. Multiple segment investing firms have an insignificant average announcement period abnormal retum of 0.03% (median of 0.01 %). Only 50.6% of their announcement effects are positive.
B. Analysis of Subsamples
Table 3 also shows that the mean difference between the announcement period abnormal retums for single and multiple segment investing firms is 1.08%. A r-test shows that the mean difference is statistically significant at the 1% level. Equal median abnormal return can also be rejected at the 1% level, based on a Wilcoxon rank-sum test. These findings are consistent with the investment opportunities hypothesis that capital investments are more worthwhile for focused firms than for diversified firms, but appear to be inconsistent with the intemal capital markets hypothesis. Note, however, that the two hypotheses are not mutually exclusive, A more cautious interpretation would be that the investtnent opportunities hypothesis dominates the internal capital markets hypothesis in terms of the net effect on the capital investing firms' abnormal returns, Ĉ
. Cross-Sectional Regression Analyses Table 4 presents cross-sectional regression analyses of the announcement period abnormal returns. The f-values are computed with heteroskedasticityconsistent standard errors if tests reject homoskedasticity at the 10% significance level (White (1980) ), Following Berger and Ofek (1995) , Comment and Jarrell (1995) , Denis et al, (1997), and Campa and Kedia (2002) , I use a dummy variable for corporate focus that equals one for focused firms (with a single business segment) and zero for diversified firms (with multiple business segments). To test the robustness of the results, I use three alternative measures of corporate focus: number of business segments, the revenue-based Herfindahl index, and the asset-based Herfindahl index.
In Models 1 through 4 of Table 4 , corporate focus is the only explanatory variable. The coefficients for the focus dummy and the revenue-based and assetbased Herfindahl indices are significantly positive, while the coefficient for the number of business segments is significantly negative. These results suggest a more favorable announcement effect of capital investments for focused firms, again supporting the investment opportunities hypothesis.
In Model 5,1 include additional variables that may affect announcement period abnormal returns, Lang et al, (1991) and Chen and Ho (1997) suggest that capital investments by firms with good investment opportunities are generally regarded as worthwhile, whereas those by firms with poor investment opportunities are not, I use Tobin's q to measure a firm's investment opportunities. The investment opportunities hypothesis predicts a positive relation between a firm's Tobin's q and share price response to a capital expenditure announcement.
Free cash flow can also be an important consideration in determining the value-enhancing potential of capital investments, Jensen (1986) argues that managers endowed with free cash fiow will invest wastefuUy, rather than pay it out to shareholders. The free cash fiow theory predicts an inverse relation between market response to a capital expenditure announcement and the firm's free cash flow, I also control for the announcing firm's financial leverage, Jensen (1986) suggests that firms with more free cash flow choose higher levels of debt as a credible precommitment to pay out the excess cash, hence reducing the expected costs of free cash flow. This implies a positive relation between the market response to announcements of capital expenditure decisions and the firm's debt ratio, Atiase (1985) and Kang and Stulz (1996) suggest that infonnation asymmetry is likely to be more severe for small firms, so I expect the market valuation of capital expenditures to be negatively related to firm size. Following Woolridge and Snow (1990) , I include the size of the investment in the analysis. If investment affects wealth, the size of the investment is important. Finally, managerial ownership is included to control for ownership structure effects (Jensen and Meckling *When I follow Hadlock et al, (2001) and Thomas (2002) and evaluate capital investing firms in similar industries, my conclusions remain unchanged. Table 4 presents cross-sectional regression analyses of announcement period abnormal returns on the corporate structure and controi variabies for the sampie of capital investments. The dependent variable is the two-day ( -1,0) announcement period abnormai return for the announcing firm. The revenue-based Herfindahl index is calcuiated as the sum of the squares cf each segment's revenue as a proportion of totai revenue, whiie the asset-based Herfindahi index is ccmputed in the same way using the booi( vaiue of identifiable assets cf the segment. Tobin's p, free cash flew, debt ratic, firm size, size of investment, and managerial ownership are defined in Tabie 2. R&D intensity of the investment segment is defined as the ratio of R&D expenditures to net sales for the segment in which the oapitai investment is made, for the fiscal year before the announcement. The f-values in parentheses are ccmputed with heterosi^edasticity-consistent standard errors if tests reject homcskedasticity at the 10% significance ievel (White (1980) ). The number of observations varies across regressions because cf data unavailability. *", ", and * represent1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels. (1976)). If managers have a greater stake in the firm, their wealth would be reduced by a bad investment, and so the presumption is that they will be less likely to make such an investment. The alignment of interests hypothesis predicts a positive relation between the fraction of the firm's equity held by management and the share price response to capital expenditure announcements.
Results in Model 5 of Table 4 are consistent with results so far, although there are fewer observations because of some missing data. After controlling for other influences, the investment opportunities hypothesis still dominates the internal capital markets hypothesis. The coefficient for the asset-based Herfindahl index is significantly positive. The results are similar for the other three measures of corporate focus, so I do not report them here.
The coefficient on Tobin's q in Model 5 is positive and statistically significant. Firms with better investment opportunities experience more positive abnor-mal retums when they announce a capital investment. This result supports the notion that investments by firms with good investment opportunities are generally regarded as more worthwhile than those by firms with poor investment opportunities. While the coefficient on the asset-based Herfindahl index in Model 5 is smaller than that in Model 4, it remains positive and significant at tbe 5% level. This change is exactly what would be expected if focused firms have better investment opportunities and Tobin's q partially proxies for the level of investment opportunities. Tbe estimates in Model 5 are consistent with the hypothesis that Tobin's q and the asset-based Herfindahl index are both noisy measures of investment opportunities. Since focused firms will tend to have higher levels of both the asset-based Herfindahl index and Tobin's q, I interpret the estimates as adding support for the investment opportunities hypothesis.
The coefficient on firm size in Model 5 is significantly negative. The smaller the firm, the more favorable the market response to the announcement. This evidence suggests tbat information asymmetry is more severe for smaller firms. T o assess the robustness of the regression results, in Model 6 of Table 4 I replace Tobin's q by the R&D intensity of the investment segment, defined as the ratio of R&D expenditures to net sales for the fiscal year before the announcement, according to information from the WSJ and Compustat. By this altemative variable, I can measure the investment opportunities of the segment in which the capital investment is made (Denis (1994) , Denis et al. (1997) , and Hyland and Diltz (2002) ). While there are fewer observations for Model 6 because of data unavailability, capital investments still produce a more favorable valuation effect for firms with focused activities and higher growth opportunities, as well as for smaller firms. Tbe results for tbe otber variables in the regression model are unaffected.
IV. Corporate Structure and Post-Investment Operating Performance
Operating performance of firms surrounding announcements provides additional evidence on the role of corporate structure in explaining the economic impact of capital investments. Healy, Palepu, and Ruback (1992) , Clark and Ofek (1994) , and Heron and Lie (2002) document that the economic impact at the announcement of corporate investment decisions is reflected in the firms' postinvestment operating performance. Following John and Ofek (1995) , Barber and Lyon (1996) , and Loughran and Ritter (1997) , I measure the operating performance of each investing firm using four accounting ratios: i) eamings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) to sales; ii) EBITDA to book value of assets; iii) net income (NI) to sales; and iv) NI to book value of assets. The data come from Compustat.
'(have also included the following variables in Model 5: i) managerial ownership squared to allow for a possible nonlinear relationship (as in McConnell and Servaes (1990) and Denis et al. (1997) ); ii) residual volatility as an altemative measure of information asymmetry (as in Hadlock et al. (2001) and Thomas (2002) ); and iii) an overinvestment dummy variable that takes a value of one if the firm has a Tobin's q below one and has a free cash flow ratio above the sample median, and zero otherwise. Inclusion of these variables does not change the results.
I examine the operating performance of the investing firm in the investment year (year 0) and over the three-year period following the investment year (years +1 to +3), I then compare the performance variables in year 0 with those in years +1, +2, and +3 to measure the change in the firm's operating performance following the capital investment. To control for industry effects, I adjust the change in the performance variables by subtracting from the investing firm's change the median change over the same period for all firms in Compustat with the same four-digit primary SIC code (following John and Ofek (1995) and others), P anel A of Table 5 presents the changes in the measures of operating performance following the capital investment, according to firm type,' f-tests and Wilcoxon signed-rank tests are used to test the hypotheses that the means and medians are equal to zero. Differences in means and medians between single and multiple segment investing firms are assessed using r-tests and Wilcoxon ranksum tests.
In year 0, both single and multiple segment investing firms perform better than their industry counterparts, according to mean and median industry-adjusted ratios of EBITDA/sales, EBlTDA/assets, Nl/sales, and Nl/assets, Single segment firms have significantly higher mean and median levels of all unadjusted and industry-adjusted accounting ratios than multiple segment firms. This evidence suggests that in year 0, single segment investing firms perform better than multiple segment investing firms.
The single segment investing firms in the sample experience significant improvements in operating performance after a capital investment. All measures of mean and median changes in operating performance between year 0 and years + 1, +2, and +3 are positive and mostly statistically significant at the 10% level or better. The same is true for industry-adjusted figures. Post-investment operating performance results for single segment investing firms are consistent with the return performance results in Table 3 in that these firms experience a significantly positive stock price response to their announcements of capital investments.
The multiple segment firms, however, generally experience no significant changes in operating performance following a capital investment. All measures of their mean and median changes in operating performance through year +3 are statistically insignificantly different from zero, except for the mean changes in the EBITDA/assets ratio from year 0 to years +2 and +3 (marginally negative at the 10% level). Results are similar for industry-adjusted figures. The post-investment operating performance results for multiple segment investing firms are also consistent with the return results in Table 3 ; multiple segment firms experience a statistically insignificant share price response to announcements of capital investments.
The mean and median differences between the unadjusted changes in operating performance from year 0 to year +3 for the two groups are positive for all measures of operating performance. These differences are all statistically significant at the 10% level or better. Differences between changes from year 0 to yearŝ As indicated by Guenther and Rosman (1994) and Kahle and Walkling (1996) , CRSP SIC codes are not very representative of the industries in which firms actually operate, which can lead to imprecise inferences. Compustat SIC codes appear to be more reliable.
'The samples in Table 5 are smaller because of data unavailability.
+1 and +2 for the two groups are generally positive and significant. Single segment firms continue to show better post-investment operating performance than multiple segment firms in industry-adjusted changes. The post-investment operating performance results are consistent with the retum results in that abnormal stock retums associated with capital investment announcements are more favorable for focused firms than for diversified firms. Table 5 presents the mean and median changes in the various measures of operating performanoe foliov/ing capitai investments for subsampies by firm type. In Panel A, the operating performance measures at the firm ievei are the investing firm's earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBiTDA) and net income (Nl), scaied by saies and assets, in Panel B, the operating performance measures at the segment level are EBiTDA scaied by sales and assets for the segment in v«hich the capital investment is made, (-tests and Wilcoxon signed-rank tests are used to test the hypotheses that the means and medians are equai to zero. Differences in means and medians are assessed using f-tests and Wiicoxon rank-sum tests. The number of observations varies because of data unavaiiabiiity. ***, **, and ' represent 1%, 5%, and 10% significance ievels.
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EBiTDA/Saies Year 0 ievel industry-adjusted year 0 ieveiĈ hange from year 0 to 1*' Change from year 0 to 2'' Change from year 0 to 3'' Industry-adjusted change, year 0 to 1*Î ndustry-adjusted change, year 0 to 2"Î ndustry-adjusted change, year 0 to 3^Ê •^Difference between the change in the investing firm's performance ratio from year 0 to year (and the median change in its industry. ''Difference betv«een the investment segment's performance ratio and the industry's median ratio in year 0, where the ihdustry's median ratio is calculated for all Compustat segments with the same four-digit segment SIC code. Change in the investment segment's performance ratio between year 0 and year (. 'Difference between the change in the investment segment's performance ratio from year 0 to year / and the median change in its industry Alt these findings provide further support for the hypothesis that capital investments are more worthwhile for focused firms than for diversified firms. While the operating performance results appear inconsistent with the internal capital markets hypothesis, I should note again that the two hypotheses are not mutually exclusive, A more cautious conclusion might be that the investment opportunities hypothesis dominates the internal capital markets hypothesis in terms of operating performance results.
BITOA/Assets
Panel B of Table 5 describes the changes in operating performance at the segment level, Nl/sales and Nl/assets at the segment level are not available from Compustat, so I only report results for EBIDTA/sales and EBIDTA/assets, To control for industry effects, I adjust the change in the performance variables by subtracting the median change for all segments in Compustat with the same fourdigit segment SIC code. The results in Panel B are similar to those in Panel A, Single segment investing firms display significantly better post-investment operating performance. This again supports the hypothesis that capital investments create more economic value for focused firms than for diversified firms. Table 6 provides further analysis of the relation between changes in postinvestment operating performance and degree of corporate focus, I regress the industry-adjusted changes in the various measures of operating performance from year 0 to year 3 on the degree of corporate focus, I present results measured by the asset-based Herfindahl index because the results are similar for the other three measures of corporate focus. In Panel A, results by firm level show that the changes in the EBITDA/sales, EBITDA/assets, Nl/sales, and Nl/assets ratios are all significantly positively related to the asset-based Herfindahl index. This indicates that focused firms perform better in the profitability measures following the capital investment. For results at the segment level. Panel B documents a similar relation between corporate structure and post-investment changes in the EBITDA/sales and EBITDA/assets ratios. My findings suggest that focused firms experience better post-investment operating performance than diversified firms. The Table 6 results provide additional support that the investment opportunities hypothesis dominates the internal capital markets hypothesis. Table 6 presents the relation between corporate structure and changes in the various measures of operating performance foiiowing capital investments, in Panei A, the operating performance measures at the firm ievei are the investing firm's earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) and net income (Nl), scaled by sales and assets. In Panel B, the operating performance measures at the segment ievel are EBITDA scaled by sales and assets for the segment in which the capital investment is made. The dependent variable is the Industry-adjusted change in the performance ratio from year 0 to year 3, where year 0 is the fiscal year in which the capital investment is announced. The asset-based Herfindahl index is caiculated as the sum of the squares of each segment's assets as a proportion of totai assets. The (-vaiues in parentheses are computed with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors if tests reject homoskedasticity at the 10% significance ievel (White (1980) ). The number of observations varies because of data unavaiiabiiity. "', ", and • represent 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels. 
V. Conclusion
I test the investment opportunities and the internal capital markets hypotheses to examine the importance of corporate structure in explaining the economic impact of capital investments. The investment opportunities hypothesis predicts that capital investments are more valuable for focused firms than for diversified firms, because focused firms tend to have better investment opportunities and are more likely to make positive NPV investments. The internal capital markets hypothesis predicts that capital investments are more valuable for diversified firms, because with a larger intemal capital market, diversified firms can allocate resources more efficiently and are more likely to invest in profitable capital projects.
Examination of a sample of firms that announced capital investments between 1989 and 1999 indicates that the market responds significantly positively to capital investment announcemetits of focused firms, whereas there is an insignificant response to the announcements of diversified firms. Cross-sectional regression analyses demonstrate a significantly positive relation between the market's responses to capital investment announcements and the degree of corporate focus. These results hold after controlling for other factors that may influence the stock valuation effect of capital investments. According to several measures of operating performance, focused firms exhibit significant improvements in operating performance after their capital investments. Diversified firms generally experience no significatit changes in post-investment performance. There is a significantly positive relation between post-investment operating performance changes and the degree of corporate focus. My findings overall suggest that the investment opportunities hypothesis better explains the net economic impact of capital investments for the investing firms.
